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I. INTRODUCTION
1

In Lewis v. City of Chicago the Supreme Court will determine
when the statute of limitations commences for an employee filing suit
against an employer who implements a discriminatory testing
2
practice. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”)
prohibits employment practices that are intentionally discriminatory
or have an impermissibly disparate impact—practices that, while
3
neutral on their face, disproportionately affect a protected class. Title
VII requires aggrieved employees to file their challenges to these
practices with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”) within 300 days of the allegedly illegal employment
activity. Lewis gives the Supreme Court the opportunity to resolve a
circuit split over whether, in the context of disparate impact claims,
the statute of limitations begins to run upon the announcement of the
alleged discriminatory practice or upon an employer’s use of that
4
practice.
To examine the complex issue confronting the Court, this
Commentary proceeds in five sections. Part II discusses the facts
presented in Lewis. Part III explores the legal background influencing
the Seventh Circuit’s reversal of the district court’s ruling. Part IV
explains the Seventh Circuit’s disposition of the case based on its
interpretation of the governing Supreme Court precedent. Part V
reviews the parties’ primary arguments. Part VI discusses the Court’s
likely disposition of the limitations issue.


J.D. Candidate, 2011, Duke University School of Law.
1. Lewis v. City of Chicago, No. 08-974 (U.S. argued Feb. 22, 2010).
2. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a) (West 2003).
3. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
4. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Lewis, No. 08-974 (U.S. Jan. 21, 2009).
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II. FACTS
On eleven occasions from 1996 to 2002, the City of Chicago (the
“City”) made hiring decisions based on the results of a written test
conducted in July 1995 for over 26,000 entry-level firefighter
5
candidates. Forty-five percent of those candidates were white, and 37
6
percent were black. In developing the test, the City hired expert for
the express purpose of reducing the likelihood of the outcome having
7
a disparate racial impact. The City graded the test on a 100-point
scale and then placed each applicant into one of three categories
8
based on his or her individual performance. Candidates who scored
eighty-nine or above were considered “well qualified,” those who
scored between sixty-five and eighty-eight were “qualified,” and those
9
who scored below sixty-five were deemed “not qualified.” For
10
operational and administrative reasons, the City implemented these
categories despite the test developer’s objection to the eighty-nine
cut-off score because of its arbitrariness and failure to reflect any
11
distinction between the candidates’ firefighting abilities. Of the 1782
“well qualified” applicants, 75.8 percent were white and 11.5 percent
12
were black.
On January 26, 1996, the candidates were notified of their test
scores, corresponding category placement, and the City’s intention to
13
use these results for its hiring decisions. On the same day, the Mayor
issued a press release announcing the results and the City’s plan to
14
randomly select candidates from the “well qualified” category. As
the City hired exclusively from this category for the next five years, 77
percent of the entry-level firefighters were white, and nine percent
15
were black.
The petitioners (“the applicants”) are a class of approximately
6,000 black firefighters that were deemed “qualified,” based on the

5. Petitioners’ Brief on the Merits at 3–4, Lewis, No. 08-974 (U.S. Nov. 23, 2009).
6. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 5, Lewis, No.
08-974 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2009) [hereinafter Brief for the United States].
7. Brief for Respondent in Opposition at 2, Lewis, No. 08-974 (U.S. Apr. 10, 2009).
8. Petitioners’ Brief on the Merits, supra note 5, at 4.
9. Id.
10. Brief for Respondent in Opposition, supra note 7, at 5 n.2.
11. Petitioners’ Brief on the Merits, supra note 5, at 11.
12. Brief for Respondent in Opposition, supra note 7, at 3.
13. Petitioners’ Brief on the Merits, supra note 5, at 5.
14. Id.
15. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 4, at 6.
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16

written test results. The first charge was filed with the EEOC on
March 31, 1997, more than one year after the initial announcement of
17
the test results. On July 28, 1998, the EEOC issued the necessary
18
right-to-sue letters to the applicants. The applicants filed suit in the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois on September
19
9, 1998, alleging impermissible disparate impact.
20
The district court ruled in favor of the applicants. It held that the
July 1995 test—specifically the “statistically meaningless” benchmark
21
between the “qualified” and “well qualified” categories —was not
“job related for the position in question [nor] consistent with business
22
necessity,” and had a disparate impact on the black applicants by
disproportionately placing them in the “qualified” rather than the
23
“well qualified” category. On appeal, the City did not refute the
district court’s finding that the test violated Title VII’s disparate
24
impact provisions. Instead, the City’s sole argument was that the
25
district court erred because applicants’ suit was time-barred.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer to make hiring
decisions or “to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or
applicants for employment . . . because of . . . race, color, religion, sex,
26
or national origin.” In states with administrative agencies to remedy
the employment practices proscribed by Title VII, the time period for
injured plaintiffs to file their charges with the EEOC is 300 days after
the unlawful act occurs; if there is no such agency, the plaintiff has 180
27
days to file. Thereafter, if the EEOC or Attorney General does not
file a civil action, the EEOC issues plaintiffs “right to sue” letters
28
allowing them to file suit against defendants within ninety days.

16. Id.
17. Brief for the United States, supra note 6, at 5.
18. Id. at 6.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 7.
21. Id.
22. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (West 2003).
23. Lewis v. City of Chicago, 528 F.3d 488, 490 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 47
(2009).
24. Brief for the United States, supra note 6, at 7–8.
25. Lewis, 528 F.3d at 490.
26. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a).
27. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (West 2003).
28. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (The EEOC “shall so notify the person aggrieved and
within ninety days after the giving of such notice a civil action may be brought against the
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Supreme Court precedent establishes that two critical questions must
be answered to determine when the statute of limitations begins to
run: (1) does the conduct rise to the level of an unlawful employment
29
practice and (2) when did that practice occur?
30
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the Supreme Court explained that
Congress passed Title VII to remedy the consequences of all
31
discriminatory hiring practices, whether intentional or not. The
Court concluded that Title VII’s prohibition of illegitimate
employment practices encompasses not only overt discrimination
where intent is the defining element (disparate treatment), but also
facially neutral practices that are “discriminatory in operation”
32
(disparate impact).
The prohibition of disparate impact discrimination was codified
33
twenty years later in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (the “Act”). Under
the Act, a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of impermissible
disparate impact by demonstrating that his employer “uses a
particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or nation origin,” and the employer
then fails to satisfy his burden of “demonstrat[ing] that the challenged
practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with
business necessity.” Even if the employer successfully demonstrates
that the practice is job related and consistent with business necessity,
the plaintiff can still establish a prima facie case if the employer did
not use feasible alternative practices with fewer discriminatory
34
effects.
35
In its analysis in Lewis v. City of Chicago, the Seventh Circuit
deemed especially relevant a line of Supreme Court cases that
considered disparate treatment (rather than disparate impact) claims.
These cases distinguished the violation itself from the violation’s
continuing “adverse effects” for purposes of determining when the
36
limitations period began to run. The inevitable consequences of the
initial discriminatory act do not perpetually extend the statute of

respondent named in the charge . . . .”).
29. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 110 (2002).
30. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
31. Id. at 432.
32. Id. at 431.
33. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat. 1071, 1074–75 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)).
34. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
35. Lewis v. City of Chicago, 528 F.3d 488 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 47 (2009).
36. Id. at 490.
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37

limitations. But in cases where discrete discriminatory acts occur,
38
each subsequent unlawful action is an independent violation.
39
Delaware State College v. Ricks was one of the first disparate
treatment cases raising a limitations issue. In that case, a college
intentionally discriminated against a professor when it denied him
40
tenure on the basis of national origin. The professor filed his charge
with the EEOC when he was terminated a year later pursuant to a
one-year “terminal” contract, not when the school denied him
41
tenure. The Supreme Court held that the filing period begins to run
when the intentional act of employment discrimination takes place—
here, the denial of tenure, not when a later, but inevitable
42
consequence of that original act occurs. Under this reasoning, the
professor’s inevitable termination was simply an unfortunate effect of
the earlier discriminatory act and did not constitute a “present
43
violation.”
44
In Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., the Supreme Court again
considered a consequence of an intentionally discriminatory
employment practice. Here, the intentionally discriminatory act was a
change in the way seniority under a collective-bargaining agreement
45
was calculated. Plaintiffs challenged the change four years after
46
receiving demotions as a result of the new system. The Court noted
that if the plaintiffs’ allegation were one of disparate impact where
discriminatory intent is not an element, the charge-filing period would
47
run from the time the impact was felt. But, as in disparate treatment
cases, Title VII makes discriminatory intent a necessary element of
48
claims challenging seniority systems. The Court concluded that the
date the seniority system was modified governs the limitations period
because the discriminatory effect of the facially nondiscriminatory
37. Id.
38. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), superseded by statute,
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 3, 123 Stat. 5, 5–6 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3)).
39. Delaware State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980).
40. Id. at 254.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 258.
43. Id.
44. Lorance v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 112, 112 Stat. 1071, 1078–79 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(e)(2) (West 2010)).
45. Id. at 900.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 908.
48. Id. at 904–05.
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practice depended entirely upon the alleged illegality of the change to
49
the system. Thus, the plaintiffs’ claim was untimely because it was
based on intentionally discriminatory conduct that occurred outside
50
the limitations period. In direct response to this decision, Congress
amended Title VII’s seniority system provisions to allow applicants to
file suit based on either the adoption or injurious application of an
51
intentionally discriminatory seniority system.
Most recently, the Supreme Court addressed how the limitations
period applies to Title VII claims in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire &
52
Rubber Co. In Ledbetter, a female employee brought a Title VII
claim on the basis that her employer gave her intentionally
discriminatory poor performance evaluations that resulted in lower
53
pay raises than her male counterparts until the end of her career. In
holding that the claim was time-barred, the Supreme Court
determined that the use of a non-discriminatory pay structure does
not give rise to a new Title VII claim simply because it furthers the
long-term effects of an intentional discriminatory act that occurred
54
outside the charging period. The Court emphasized, however, that
an independent violation always commences a new tolling period
55
regardless of its connection to other previous violations.
Interestingly, the Court acknowledged that the plaintiff’s claim could
have succeeded under the Equal Pay Act, which, unlike Title VII, does
56
not require proof of discriminatory intent.
57
The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 effectively overturned
the Ledbetter holding. The Act amended Title VII’s discriminatory
58
compensation provisions to expand the scope of employer liability.
49. Id. at 911.
50. Id. at 908.
51. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 112, 112 Stat. 1071, 1078–79 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(2) ( “[A]n unlawful employment practice occurs, with
respect to a seniority system that has been adopted for an intentionally discriminatory purpose
in violation of this title (whether or not that discriminatory purpose is apparent on the face of
the seniority provision), when the seniority system is adopted, when an individual becomes
subject to the seniority system, or when a person aggrieved is injured by the application of the
seniority system or provision of the system.”).
52. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), superseded by statute,
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 3, 123 Stat. 5, 5–6 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3)).
53. Id. at 621–22.
54. Id. at 633.
55. Id. at 636.
56. Id. at 640.
57. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(e)(3)(A) (West Supp.
2009).
58. Id.
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It allows an aggrieved employee to file suit when an employer adopts
a discriminatory compensation decision or practice, when an
employee becomes subjected to an existing discriminatory
compensation decision or practice, or whenever the employee is
affected by the application of a discriminatory compensation decision
59
or practice.
IV. HOLDING
In determining whether the applicants’ suit in Lewis v. City of
Chicago was time-barred, the Seventh Circuit found that neither the
60
doctrine of continuing violation nor the doctrine of equitable tolling
61
applied. The court concluded that the injury occurred and the
statute of limitations started to toll when the city evaluated the
62
plaintiffs’ eligibility on the basis of the test. The first applicant filed
his charge 420 days after the City mailed the notices announcing the
63
test results. The district court concluded the suit was timely because
the claim was filed within 300 days of the time that the City first
“used” the discriminatory practice by hiring applicants from the “well
64
qualified” category. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the
statute of limitations began to run when the applicants were notified
65
of their test results.
66
The court based its decision on appellate court precedent and
67
the Supreme Court cases discussed above, which held that the

59. Id.
60. Lewis v. City of Chicago, 528 F.3d 488, 493 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 47
(2009) (“The doctrine of continuing violation allows you to delay suing until a series of acts by a
prospective defendant blossoms into a wrongful injury on which a suit can be based. . . . Despite
its name, it is a doctrine about cumulative rather than continuing violation. . . . Extension of the
‘continuing violation’ doctrine in the manner urged by plaintiffs would have ludicrous
consequences.”).
61. Id. (“The doctrine of equitable tolling allows a plaintiff additional time within which to
sue . . . if even diligent efforts on his part would not have enabled him to prepare and file his suit
within the statutory period.”).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 490.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 491.
66. Id. at 490–492 (citing Cox v. City of Memphis, 230 F.3d 199, 204–05 (6th Cir. 2000);
Huels v. Exxon Coal USA, Inc., 121 F.3d 1047, 1051 (7th Cir. 1997); Davidson v. Board of
Governors, 920 F.2d 441, 445 (7th Cir. 1990)). But see Hamilton v. 1st Source Bank, 928 F.2d 86,
87–88 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc)).
67. Id. at 490 (citing Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber, Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007),
superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 3, 123 Stat. 5, 5–
6 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3)); Lorance v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S.
900 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 112, 112 Stat.

140

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 5:133

tolling period for a disparate treatment charge begins to run when the
68
“discriminatory decision is made. . . rather than when it is executed.”
Invoking the Supreme Court’s holding in Delaware State College v.
Ricks, the Seventh Circuit concluded that hiring only candidates who
had scored in the “well qualified” category “was the automatic
consequence of the test scores rather than the product[] of a fresh act
69
of discrimination.” The Seventh Circuit rejected the applicants’
argument that the Supreme Court’s holding in Ricks applied only to
disparate treatment cases by concluding that no fundamental
70
difference exists between the two types of discrimination.
V. ARGUMENTS
The crux of the applicants’ and the City’s dispute is whether an
actionable claim accrued each time the City made hiring decisions
based on the original results of the July 1995 examination. Both sides
rely on same line of Supreme Court cases to support their respective
positions. The discussion below describes these arguments in turn.
A. Petitioners’ Primary Arguments
The applicants’ argument has three general facets. First, both Title
VII and Supreme Court precedent point to differing accrual periods
for disparate treatment and disparate impact claims. Second, practical
considerations confirm the logic of making this distinction. Third, the
evidentiary concerns supporting a more limited tolling period for
disparate treatment claims do not exist in disparate impact cases.
1. First, the applicants argue that each use of a discriminatory
written examination in the City’s hiring practice is actionable under
71
Title VII. This argument rests primarily upon the remedial aim and
plain meaning of Title VII’s disparate impact and charge-filing
72
provisions. As long as all the required elements independently exist,
they claim, a Title VII claim commences a new charge-filing period

1071, 1078–79 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(2));Delaware State College v.
Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980)). These cases held that for a Title VII disparate treatment charge to
be timely, a plaintiff must identify an act of intentional discrimination within the statutory
period of limitations, rather than an effect or consequence of a past act of intentional
discrimination.
68. Id. at 490.
69. Lewis, 528 F.3d at 491.
70. Id.
71. Petitioners’ Brief on the Merits, supra note 5, at 15.
72. Id.
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73

even if it is related to a prior violation. The applicants stress the
Supreme Court’s repeated conclusion that an actionable “claim
74
accrues when all elements of a Title VII violation are present.”
Accordingly, the applicants assert they timely filed their claim because
all of the elements of a Title VII violation were present each time they
75
were passed over for employment. Title VII expressly proscribes all
employment actions, including hiring decisions, which have an
76
impermissible disparate impact on a protected class. Here, the
applicants argue, the City’s use of the hiring selection process
constituted an independent violation of Title VII, regardless of how
much time has elapsed since the initial announcement of the test
77
results.
Supreme Court precedent has emphasized that a disparate
treatment claim is complete when an employer has adopted or
announced an intentionally discriminatory practice, not when the
78
plaintiff suffered a later consequence of that act. Conversely, in a
disparate impact case, where intent is not an element, a claim accrues
79
when “that impact is felt.” Although the Seventh Circuit regarded
the distinction between the two types of claims as “not
80
fundamental,” the applicants insist that this distinction in accrual
periods is embodied in Title VII and has been consistently honored by
81
the Supreme Court.
Because of these differing elements in disparate treatment and
disparate impact cases, the applicants argue the Seventh Circuit
should not have relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Delaware
82
State College v. Ricks. Ricks was a Title VII disparate treatment case
that did not address the timeliness of claims in disparate impact
83
cases. The Supreme Court rejected the claims in Ricks, Lorance v.
AT&T Technologies, Inc., and Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber

73. Id.
74. Petitioners’ Brief on the Merits, supra note 5, at 15.
75. Brief for the United States, supra note 6, at 23.
76. Id. at 24 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(2), (k)(1)(A)).
77. Id. at 28.
78. Petitioners’ Brief on the Merits, supra note 5, at 15.
79. Id. (quoting Lorance v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 908 (1989), superseded by
statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 112, 112 Stat. 1071, 1078–79 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(2)).
80. Lewis v. City of Chicago, 528 F.3d 488, 491 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 47
(2009).
81. Brief for the United States, supra note 6, at 22.
82. Petitioners’ Brief on the Merits, supra note 5, at 38.
83. Id.
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Co., not because they stemmed from earlier violations, but because
they failed to allege an intentionally discriminatory act during the
84
limitations period. In contrast, discriminatory intent is not an
85
element of the disparate impact claim in Lewis. Thus, the existence
of such intent is irrelevant to the limitations period, which begins to
run only when the challenged practice produces a discriminatory
86
effect.
2. As a practical matter, the accrual rule advocated by the
applicants makes sense because once employees realize they have
suffered injury due to the disparate impact of an employment practice
they have every reason to file promptly since their interests lie in
attaining the employment opportunities that they were allegedly
87
denied. On the other hand, the rule espoused by the Seventh Circuit
would encourage plaintiffs to file disparate impact charges before
they are sure of “whether and how” test results will be used; that is,
before all the facts needed to prove a disparate impact claim have
“crystallized” and before there is any certainty that the results of an
illegitimate test will actually be used and have practical
88
consequences. For example, employers often use test scores to rank
candidates to make hiring decisions over time “with individuals often
unable to predict when, if ever they might be provided or denied job
89
opportunities based on those ranking.” Therefore, the Seventh
Circuit’s application of Title VII’s charge-filing provisions perversely
incentivizes individuals to file suit in order not to “forever lose their
90
right to do so,” even if no practical consequences have materialized.
Under the Seventh Circuit rule, aggrieved employees may face a loselose situation when a practice’s adverse impact is not immediately
apparent: they either do not have standing because they have not yet
been adversely impacted by the practices application, or, when a
concrete injury occurs and the discriminatory impact is felt, the tolling
91
period has expired.

84. Brief for the United States, supra note 6, at 22.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 29.
88. Id. at 31–33.
89. Brief of the National Partnership for Women & Families and the National Women's
Law Center et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 11, Lewis v. City of Chicago, No.
08-974 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2009) (explaining that “the Seventh Circuit’s rule . . . fails to address the
reality that the consequences of an employer’s creation of an eligibility list based rank-order or
cut-off scores are often far from clear at the time of its adoption”).
90. Id. at 13.
91. See id. at 17 (explaining that in non-testing contexts, even when a practice’s adverse
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As noted by the Solicitor General, if the Seventh Circuit’s
decision is affirmed, the Court would essentially condone an
employer’s use of implicitly unlawful selection criteria as long as no
one filed a charge within 300 days after the test results were
92
announced. Such an interpretation, the Solicitor General warned,
would cut against the very purpose of Title VII—”remov[ing]
artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the
barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or
93
other impermissible classification.”
The International Association of Official Human Rights Agencies
(“IAOHRA”) filed an amicus brief in favor of the applicants making
additional arguments regarding the practical implications of the
94
Seventh Circuit’s decision. Based on their extensive experience in
95
processing employment discrimination charges, IAOHRA argued
that a widespread application of the Seventh Circuit’s rule would
place additional burdens on the EEOC and local Fair Employment
Practices Agencies, which already face the largest caseload in history,
96
due to the increase in volume of charges filed. Potential
discrimination claims could be resolved if workers could wait to see if
employers hired in a discriminatory fashion as opposed to potential
litigants simply filing due to the pressures imposed by an accrual rule
97
limited to the announcement of a hiring practice.
3. Finally, the applicants contended that the legitimate evidentiary
concerns existing in disparate treatment cases are not applicable to
98
disparate impact cases. Because evidence of mental culpability is not
needed to prove a claim of disparate impact, the pertinent evidence,
typically “focus[ing] on statistical disparities, rather than specific
99
incidents,” is not weakened or lost as time passes. Thus, the
resolution of the merits of a disparate impact case are not
impact is immediately apparent, courts have focused on the practice’s impact rather than its
adoption).
92. Brief for the United States, supra note 6, at 31.
93. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
94. Brief for Amicus Curiae International Association of Official Human Rights Agencies
in Support of Petitioners at 2, Lewis, No. 08-974 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2009) [hereinafter Brief for
IAOHRA]. The IAOHRA represents Fair Employment Practices Agencies (FEPAs) who
share administrative responsibilities with the EEOC. Among the responsibilities of IAOHRA is
determining the timeliness of discrimination charges.
95. Id. at 1.
96. Id. at 14.
97. Id.
98. Brief for the United States, supra note 6, at 30 (explaining that the passage of time does
not raise the same concerns in disparate impact cases as it does in disparate treatment cases).
99. Id. (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987 (1988)).
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compromised by allowing employees to recover whenever they are
injured by the use of an unlawful practice, even if this occurs years
100
after its implementation. Any unreasonable or prejudicial delay by
an employee in filing a charge would warrant an employer’s
101
invocation of the laches defense.
B. Respondent’s Primary Arguments
The thrust of the City’s argument was that the Seventh Circuit was
correct in holding that no new violations occurred after the adoption
102
Instead, the applicants only
and announcement of the invalid list.
experienced “predictable consequences of [that] prior discriminatory
103
act.” The City conceded that the applicants successfully proved that
using the test results to create the eligibility list had an unlawful
disparate racial impact, but not that the consequent hiring of
applicants who fell in the well qualified category had any further
104
Highlighting the Supreme Court’s holdings
disparate impact.
confirming that Title VII claims accrue when the unlawful discrete act,
105
not a present effect of that act, occurs, the City maintained that only
the initial test score classification injured the applicants and
106
commenced the limitations period. In using the list, no additional
act of discrimination (in treatment or impact) was committed and no
107
additional injury was suffered.
The City also pointed out that when Congress has disagreed with
Supreme Court rulings, it has amended Title VII’s file-charging
108
The specific amendments following the Lorance and
provisions.
Ledbetter decisions are not implicated by the applicants’ claim,
109
leaving the Court’s reasoning in these cases entirely applicable.
Thus, the Supreme Court’s “discrete act” accrual rule should extend
to both disparate treatment and disparate impact claims because
110
nothing in Title VII indicates any reason for applying different rules.

100. Id.
101. Id. at 29.
102. Supplemental Brief for Respondent in Opposition at 10, Lewis v. City of Chicago, No.
08-974 (U.S. Sept. 2, 2009).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 8 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(2), 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i)).
105. Id. at 6.
106. Id. (quoting Delaware State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 257–58 (1980)).
107. Id. at 7.
108. Brief for Respondent in Opposition, supra note 7, at 18 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e5(e)(2), 2000e-(e)(3)(A)).
109. Brief for Respondent in Opposition, supra note 7, at 13 n.3.
110. Id. at 17.
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Under this reasoning, the Seventh Circuit determined that the same
rule applied to the applicants’ case because Title VII distinguishes
disparate treatment and disparate impact only as methods of proving
discrimination claims, not “types of discriminatory acts in and of
111
themselves.” The City argued that there would be no justification in
extending the filing period for disparate impact claims that are proven
with circumstantial evidence while maintaining the limited filing
period for disparate treatment cases that are proven with “direct
112
evidence of discrimination.”
In response to the applicants’ argument that the broad remedial
purpose of Title VII is inconsistent with a relatively short limitations
period, the City emphasized that applicants failed to acknowledge
that Title VII’s intentionally brief filing periods also exist to protect
113
Congress
employers’ reasonable reliance and repose interests.
114
expressly opted for a short filing period rather than a longer one.
This intentionally brief period reflects the “delicate balance” between
protecting the civil rights of employees who promptly seek redress
115
and employers from stale claims. A short statute of limitations
allows agencies or the courts to resolve claims when “memories are
clear; the harm is limited; and reliance interests of employers and
116
other employees have not yet crystallized.”
The City dismissed the applicants’ “unfounded” fear that a
restrictive filing period may “immunize” employers because eligibility
lists are only used until a subsequent examination is administered and
any instance of present discrimination will always give rise to another
117
claim. In contrast, a liberal filing period would present employers
with an uncertain period of liability and frustrate the reasonable
reliance interests of both employers and other employees in regard to
118
implemented practices. Regardless, the City insists that applicants’
arguments for a broad accrual rule for disparate impact cases are
undermined by the fact that every applicant was aware of an
actionable claim within the time to meet the tolling deadline but
119
simply chose to wait.

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id.
Supplemental Brief for Respondent in Opposition, supra note 102, at 8.
Brief for Respondent in Opposition, supra note 7, at 19–20.
Supplemental Brief for Respondent in Opposition, supra note 102, at 10–11.
Brief for Respondent in Opposition, supra note 7, at 19–20.
Supplemental Brief for Respondent in Opposition, supra note 102, at 10–11.
Brief for Respondent in Opposition, supra note 7, at 20.
Id.
Id.
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VI. LIKELY DISPOSITION
This case calls upon the Supreme Court to apply its Title VII
120
statute of limitations precedent in the “slightly different context” of
testing practices with an unlawful disparate impact. The Court likely
will conclude that the accrual rules for disparate impact and disparate
treatment claims differ. The Court will therefore overturn the Seventh
Circuit’s ruling because the ruling disregarded important distinctions
between the elements of disparate impact and disparate treatment
121
claims. The Court has made clear that disparate treatment claims
accrue upon notice of an intentionally discriminatory employment
practice and not upon the occurrence of its effects because intent is an
122
Hence, to delay the running of
essential element of such a claim.
the limitations period for a disparate treatment charge until an
eventual consequence of an act of intentional discrimination would be
to ignore the defining element of the legal claim serving as the basis
123
for a plaintiff’s Title VII recovery.
The factors leading to the Court’s rejection of certain disparate
treatment claims as time-barred—lack of the requisite elements, risk
of staleness, and the ability to identify instances of intentional
discrimination when they occur—do not apply to the applicants’
disparate impact charge. As the applicants emphasize, all the requisite
elements of a disparate impact claim exist in their charge based on the
124
use of an illegitimate test. Hence, “each round of hiring only
applicants who scored 89 or above on the test constituted a
freestanding, present violation of Title VII’s disparate impact
125
prohibition that started a new and distinct charge-filing period.”
Further, by limiting the tolling period to the announcement of a
discriminatory practice, the Court would require plaintiffs to file
charges before a discriminatory impact has come to fruition, e.g.,
before there is any certainty about the gravity of an injury, if one will
120. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 621.
121. See Brief for the United States, supra note 6, at 22 (“Unlike intentional discrimination
claims . . . the ‘defining element’ of a disparate impact claim is the effect of an employment
practice on members of a protected group, rather than the employer’s intent in adopting the
practice.”).
122. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2672 (2009) (citing Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324, 355 n.15 (1977)); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 985–86 (1988)
(“Disparate-treatment cases present ‘the most easily understood type of discrimination’. . . . A
disparate-treatment plaintiff must establish ‘that the defendant had a discriminatory intent or
motive’ for taking a job-related action.”).
123. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 624.
124. Petitioners’ Brief on the Merits, supra note 5, at 15.
125. Id. at 40 (emphasis added).
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126

even occur.
The applicants’ arguments are consistent with the plain language
of Title VII, which the Court has declared as authoritative in its
127
analysis absent any ambiguity. Title VII specifically prohibits an
employer from using “a particular employment practice that causes a
disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
128
origin . . . .” The parties’ submissions make clear that the City’s
hiring selections on the basis of the test results were “uses” of a
129
concededly illegitimate test. And, as the applicants emphasize,
neither the language of Title VII nor Supreme Court precedent
indicates that an employment practice can be challenged only at the
130
time of its promulgation, and no later. If all the requisite elements
of a disparate treatment or disparate impact case are present, a fresh
claim of the occurrence of an unlawful employment practice accrues,
131
and an EEOC charge is viable within 180 or 300 days of that time.
Further, given Title VII’s goal of eliminating discrimination in the
workplace, it would be contrary to legislative intent to construe the
period of limitations so narrowly as to bar employees from redress
simply because they chose to wait for a concrete injury to fully
materialize rather than preemptively challenge a seemingly
132
discriminatory hiring practice. The Seventh Circuit’s decision is ripe
for reversal by the Supreme Court because it failed to look to the
statutory language of Title VII itself, and instead relied only upon
cases that were factually and theoretically distinct from the
applicants’ disparate impact claim.

126. Brief for IAOHRA, supra note 94, at 10.
127. See United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 498 U.S. 235, 241(1989) (The starting point of
the Supreme Court’s analysis is “the language of the statute itself.” Where “the statute’s
language is plain” that is “where inquiry should end” because “the sole function of the courts is
to enforce [the statute] according to its terms.”)
128. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (West 2003).
129. Both petitioners’ and respondent’s phrasing of the “Question Presented” expressly
refer to the City’s “use” of the discriminatory test results. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
supra note 4, at i (“Where an employer adopts an employment practice that discriminates
against African Americans in violation of Title VII's disparate impact provision, must a plaintiff
file an EEOC charge within 300 days after the announcement of the practice, or may a plaintiff
file a charge within 300 days after the employer's use of the discriminatory practice?”) (emphasis
added); see also Brief for Respondent in Opposition, supra note 7, at i (“Whether the limitations
period on a Title VII claim for disparate impact from an examination and eligibility list . . . starts
to run only when the list is adopted and announced, or also later, upon each use of the same
list.”) (emphasis added).
130. Petitioners’ Brief on the Merits, supra note 5, at 15.
131. Brief for the United States, supra note 6, at 28.
132. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (“[R]emedial legislation should be
construed broadly to effectuate its purposes.”).

